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INTRODUCTION
In his essay The Hedgehog and the Fox, Isaiah Berlin used an ancient
Greek proverb comparing these animals as a metaphor to express a deep
division among thinkers and writers in their understanding of the human
condition.2 In this essay, I extend the metaphor to contrast the differing
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law, and author of
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999). This paper is based on a
presentation the author made at the Third Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, Sep-
tember 3, 1998 in Boston, Mass. The author wishes to thank Dwight Arthur, Walter Effross,
Carl Ellison, Dan Geer, Dan Greenwood, John Gregory, and Lawrence Lessig for their
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. ISAIAH BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22 (1978) [hereinafter HEDGEHOG & Fox].
This essay was originally published as "Leo Tolstoy's Historical Scepticism" in Oxford Sla-
vonic Papers 2 (1951), citing ARCHILOCHUS FRAG. 201 IAMBI ET ELEGI GRAECI, VOL. I (M.
L. West ed.) (1971).
2. See HEDGEHOG & Fox, supra note i, at 22 (positing some individuals possess in-
tellectual and artistic personalities that relate everything to central vision while others pur-
sue many ends, which are often unrelated and contradictory).
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approaches to risk management taken by the public sector in the exercise of
its sovereign functions and that taken by members of the private sector in
the conduct of commercial transactions. In light of the differences in these
basic approaches to questions of risk management, I will evaluate some
widely discussed models of public key infrastructures 3 for administering
digital signature authentication systems. The basic model most commonly
discussed today can easily be assimilated to the public sector model of risk
management, but does not readily permit the incorporation of the most im-
portant features of private sector risk management models. As a result, I
predict that before digital signature technology will gain widespread use in
business technology, further significant progress will have to be made in
the design of public key infrastructures. In addition, I argue that a public
sector risk management model is not appropriate for new technology dis-
tributed by private actors unless there is a consensus that such an indirect
subsidy is in the public interest generally, not just in the interest of certain
private promoters of the technology. Furthermore, before the public sector
adopts digital signature technology, political issues outside the scope of
risk management policies will have to be addressed. For example, political
issues such as the degree of protection to be granted to citizens' privacy
rights within such an infrastructure will have to be resolved before a deter-
mination can be made whether the use of such a technology is genuinely in
the public interest.
I. THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX
In his essay on Tolstoy's philosophy of history, Berlin begins with the
fragment from the Greek poet Archilochus, "the fox knows many things,
but the hedgehog knows one big thing."4 The conventional interpretation
of this proverb is that the fox, for all her cunning, may be defeated by the
hedgehog's one defense. Berlin suggests the metaphor may also be used to
highlight one of the important differences between the basic visions of life
held by different thinkers and writers. 5 On the one hand there are those
who believe that there exists "a single, universal, organizing principle in
terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance." 6 On the
other side of the divide are those whose beliefs are scattered or diffuse,
moving on many levels, seizing upon a vast variety of experiences and ob-
3. There is no accepted definition of the term "public key infrastructure." In this pa-
per, the term is used to mean any system for regulating the distribution of public keys in a
networked environment.
4. HEDGEHOG & Fox, supra note I, at 22.
5. See id.
6. Id.
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jects for what they are without seeking, consciously or unconsciously, to fit
them into any one unchanging, all embracing, unitary vision. The first kind
of intellectual is like the hedgehog, the second is like the fox. 7 Berlin sug-
gests that Dante, Plato, Lucretius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche,
Ibsen and Proust are, in varying degrees, hedgehogs, while Herodotus, Ar-
istotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Moliere, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, and Joyce
are foxes.8 Berlin readily acknowledges that, "like all over-simple classifi-
cations of this type, the dichotomy becomes, if pressed, artificial, scholas-
tic, and ultimately absurd."9 Yet he argues that because the distinction
captures an important insight, it provides a useful starting point for genuine
investigation.
Having set up this distinction, Berlin uses the rest of the essay to de-
scribe and analyze Tolstoy's philosophy of history, as set forth in exposi-
tory passages scattered throughout War and Peace. Berlin believed that
Tolstoy's philosophical discussions were too often dismissed by literary
critics as a distraction from the brilliance of the novel, while at the same
time were rarely given the recognition they deserved by academic philoso-
phers.'0 Berlin argues that Tolstoy's life was characterized by a profound
longing for a vision that would permit him, like a hedgehog, to resolve the
variety of experience into one vast, unitary whole." However, his philo-
sophical and historical writings reveal that he, like a fox, was too acute in
his powers of observation to be blind to the complexity of experience, and
thus was unable ever to articulate a single vision that could account for life
as he knew it.
2
The distinction between the public and private spheres of law is about as
plastic and unreliable as Berlin's distinction between philosophical hedge-
hogs and foxes, but it likewise captures an important element of truth, and
offers a useful starting point for further analysis.' 3 The public sphere in
7. See id at 22.
8. Although scarcely mentioned in the essay, Marx would seem to be a hedgehog ac-
cording to Berlin's description of the category. Likewise, Berlin does not categorize his
own thought, but he would seem to be a fox. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTIONS
OF LIBERTY (1958) (affirming value of liberal ideal of "negative freedom" or freedom from
coercion and questioning value of "positive freedom" or freedom directed toward ideologi-
cally vetted ends).
9. HEDGEHOG & Fox, supra note 1, at 23.
10. See id. at 25.
11. See id. at 51.
12. See id.
13. An analysis of the history and complexity of the public/private distinction is be-
yond the scope of this essay. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penum-
bra - Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982) (discussing distinctions be-
tween public/private sectors). See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1992) (noting feminist challenges to public/private distinc-
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law is understood to refer to the state - its organization, its relationships
with other states and its relationships with its citizens - and the citizenry
as a collective body. The private sphere is understood to refer to relation-
ships between and among citizens acting as individuals. While the malle-
ability of this distinction has been a matter of "public" record since at least
as early as the 1948 Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,14 the
distinction nevertheless.retains a considerable vitality as a heuristic device
if not an immutable philosophical truth. For example, the debate sur-
rounding the liability of on-line service providers for injury caused by sub-
scriber's speech has required the reformulation of the line between First
Amendment protections of free speech in the public sphere and the private
cause of action for defamation which limits the scope of that public right.15
For the purposes of this essay, the public sector will refer to different
governmental units acting in their capacity as sovereigns - guardians of
the public interest and bearers of the police power. The private sector will
refer to those arenas in which individuals, whether natural persons or legal
entities, interact with each other without reference to the state except as the
ultimate enforcer of legal rights and obligations. This is not to deny that
many functions of the modem state do in fact take place in the private sec-
tor, such as when the state acts as a contracting party or waives its sover-
eign immunity from litigation with private parties, or when a traditional at-
tribute of the public sector is placed under the control of private parties, as
with the commercial operation of prisons. Rather, the focus of this paper is
limited to those aspects of the public and private spheres that clearly corre-
spond to the basic distinction sketched above, leaving for another occasion
the analysis of those fact patterns where the public/private distinction is
harder to draw. In addition, the consideration of the impact of sovereign
tion); Jurgen Habernas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 771 (1996) (contrasting
social ideal, social model, and proceduralist paradigms or images of society); Frederick
Schauer, Internet Privacy and the Public/Private Distinction, 38 JURIMErRcs J. 555 (1998)
(examining threat to individual privacy caused by onset of Internet).
14. 334 U.S. I (1948) (holding judicial enforcement of real property covenants as de-
vice to enforce racial segregation in housing violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment even though Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action, not private con-
duct).
15. This issue was first dealt with in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which held state libel laws that fail to provide for freedom of speech and press when
conduct of a public official is criticized, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) includes a safe harbor for on-line service
providers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (Supp. 111 1997). The safe harbor provided in the CDA
was intended to overrule Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). The safe harbor has been upheld notwith-
standing the unconstitutionality of other provisions of the CDA. See Zeran v. America On-
line, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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actions taken in the public sphere is limited to managing the risk of finan-
cial liability for actions taken in furtherance of the public interest, not to the
larger issues of how political processes can constrain the scope of sover-
eign authority to act.
Berlin's characterization of the hedgehog in the history of thought can
be extended to the public sector, and the characterization of the fox can be
extended to the private sector. The state as sovereign draws legitimacy in a
modem liberal regime from its ability to express and enforce the will of the
public. The state must view the individual interests of the citizenry from
the commanding heights of the interests of the public as a collective entity.
When the state, as sovereign, articulates and acts upon this idealized col-
lective will, like the hedgehog, it is integrating the diversity of human ex-
perience into a single, unified vision. Individuals and groups acting within
the private sector are never expected to achieve such heights of synthesis.
Individuals, like the fox, are expected to be acute observers of specific data,
and to use that more partial and narrow vision to operate in the fractured,
pluralistic world of the private sector. Unlike the sovereign, who is ex-
pected to administer the state in the interest of all subjects without dis-
crimination, an individual acting in a private capacity is expected to dis-
criminate among other individuals and establish relationships selectively
after evaluating the information gathered from the individual's more fo-
cused, particularistic perspective.
The risk that the sovereign will fail to execute effectively the public will,
and the risk that private parties will fail to achieve the objective of their ac-
tions, may not be thought of as commensurate risks because the conse-
quences of those failures are not normally equivalent. Failure by the sover-
eign to advance the public interest is not normally actionable within the
courts maintained by that sovereign. If it is actionable, the remedy may be
some change in the behavior of the sovereign, not monetary damages. For
example, the writ of mandamus permits an individual to seek the aid of one
government office in compelling another, subordinate government office to
carry out its duties. In other cases, the only appropriate recourse may be to
engage the political processes to modify the legal framework that consti-
tutes the sovereign, rather than to seek compensatory redress within the
existing framework. Failure by a private party to fulfill a private obligation
normally is actionable within the legal system, and under Anglo-American
principles of compensation, usually results in an award of monetary dam-
ages for the injured party.
At first glance, failure to comply with the applicable rules seems to give
rise to quite different consequences for the malfeasor, depending on
whether the malfeasor is acting in the public or private sector. Neverthe-
less, the rule of sovereign immunity from suit can be described as a loss
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allocation rule equivalent to the loss allocation rules that apply to private
parties. As a consequence of the sovereign's general immunity from suit
for monetary damages, the sovereign is permitted to externalize, onto indi-
vidual members of the public, the financial costs of the sovereign's failure
to accomplish its objectives. Although the sovereign may generally be
immune from a duty to compensate financially injured parties for the harm
they suffer at the hands of the representatives of the sovereign, the sover-
eign can still be sanctioned through political processes for failure to fulfill
its objectives. In deference to this prospect of political sanctions, a sover-
eign will allocate some level of resources toward dealing with particular
matters within its authority. The amount of government resources allocated
to addressing public concerns need not be calculated with reference to es-
timates of the number or amount of individual claims that might be made
against the sovereign in the absence of immunity, but is more likely to re-
flect the outcome of political processes and constraints. In the absence of
an insurance system, private parties generally will not have the same pre-
rogative simply to cap their investment of resources to solve particular
problems, and externalize onto other private parties the cost of any miscal-
culation. Private parties as a result must adopt more sophisticated strate-
gies for managing the risk that their action or inaction will give rise to
some harm to another party that will require financial compensation.
Just as the hedgehog's totalizing vision bears a relationship to the
hedgehog's single defense against danger, the classic public sector ap-
proach to risk management bears a relationship to the general view of soci-
ety the sovereign is expected to take in a republic. The sovereign hedgehog
evaluates the entire complex of factors related to its exercise of authority
and allocates a given level of resources to fulfill its mission in that regard.
Even when it becomes apparent that the sovereign hedgehog under-
invested in managing a specific risk of harm, the state will not be assigned
liability for that failure, although if the harm is serious enough the state
may administer disaster relief. For example, in the aftermath of the savings
and loan crisis in the 1980s, state and federal regulators were not required
to compensate those who suffered losses as a result of those failures that
were not covered by insurance schemes. The Resolution Trust Company
did use public funds to clean up the mess, but the premise for those expen-
ditures was general economic disaster relief, not compensation for regula-
tor negligence. By contrast, the private fox not only sees life in all its com-
plexity, it also has a wide array of strategies for meeting the challenges of
life. Private sector risk management strategies may be more partial or lim-
ited than in the public sector, but are also more diverse and tailored to spe-
cific contexts.
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This fundamental distinction in approaches to uncertainty has important
consequences for the design of information systems intended to manage
risk. Current designs for public key infrastructures correspond to the rela-
tively simple risk management strategies of the sovereign hedgehog. If the
public key infrastructure is designed and operated to advance the public
interest, then there is no conflict between the objectives served by the pub-
lic key infrastructure and the risk management strategy it incorporates. If
those designing and operating public key infrastructures are doing so in
furtherance of private interests, however, granting the functional equivalent
of sovereign immunity to certificate authorities 16 may be a poor risk liabil-
ity allocation model. The large amount of uncertainty surrounding the ac-
tual degree of risk of financial losses associated with the design and opera-
tion of public key infrastructures has led to pressure for legislation shifting
those risks away from those designing and operating the systems to end us-
ers of those systems. Proposals for liability limitations take two basic
forms: protection for infrastructure providers and protection for parties
wishing to rely on information provided through a secure system such as a
public key infrastructure. 17 The quid pro quo for sovereign immunity from
private sector liability rules should be a commitment to acting in the public
interest and amenability to political processes. It is not clear that a political
consensus has emerged to support the development of public key infra-
structures for private transactions without regard to what, if any, costs are
16. See RITA C. SUMMERS, SECURE COMPUTING: THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS 214
(1997) (defining certification authority as entity where users of computer systems register
individual "public keys" which grant them access to that computer system).
17. Examples of liability limitations for infrastructure providers include the Utah
Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1998), and the INFORMATION SECURITY
COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES (1996) [herein-
after ABA DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES].
Examples of liability limitations for relying parties include: The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B:
Computer Information Transactions (last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucc2b/2b299.htm>; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Draft Uniform Rules on Elec-
tronic Signatures (visited Apr. 23, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/
wgec/wp-73.htm>; and European Union draft directive on electronic signatures, Electronic
Commerce: Commission proposes electronic signatures Directive (last modified May 13,
1998) <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ dgl 5/en/media/infso/sign.htm>.
There is evidence that the limited liability approach is losing favor. See, e.g., Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Electronic Transac-
tions Act (last modified June 22, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>;
Australian Draft Electronic Transactions Exposure Bill (visited Apr. 23, 1999)
<http://law.gov.au/ecommerce/>.
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externalized onto individual members of the public.'8 If prospective pro-
moters of public key infrastructures are unwilling to bear some or all of the
liability to compensate other parties harmed as a result of contact with their
public key infrastructures, then the appropriate conclusion to draw may be
that the technology of digital signature certificates are not yet be ready for
large scale public adoption, not that the promoters should be shielded from
liability.
The appropriate way to determine whether promoters of public key in-
frastructures should be sheltered from liability to third parties is to first ar-
ticulate what public interest is served by the operation of public key infra-
structures. If the public interest served is great enough, and there are no
other risk management strategies available to minimize the dislocation
caused by adopting this new technology rather than just shifting losses
from one party to another, then the hedgehog risk management model may
be sound as a matter of public policy. It is not clear, however, that there is
any compelling public rather than private interest in the speedy rollout of
this technology. Such haste is particularly inappropriate if more sophisti-
cated models for implementing this technology are currently under devel-
opment that may be able to minimize -losses rather than simply shift them
onto a party with no ability to insure or pool risks. More sophisticated
models for integrating public key infrastructures into communication and
information systems are in fact under development which may permit the
application of more traditional private sector risk management techniques,
eliminating any need for a simple rule of immunity from liability for pri-
vate parties deploying this technology.
The problematic nature of changing the loss allocation rules that apply to
the use of this technology is equally apparent when the deployment of pub-
lic key infrastructures for indisputably public purposes is considered. As-
sume for the sake of argument that a political consensus has emerged that
this is an appropriate technology for regulating access to pornography over
the Internet.' 9 In the midst of the industrial revolution, there may have
been no alternative to using immunity from tort liability as a subsidy to im:
plement a public policy favoring a particular industry.20 In the midst of the
18. This externalized cost is the "Grandma picks a bad password and loses her house"
scenario first identified as a risk of poor public key infrastructure design by Bradford Biddle
and Michael Froomkin.
19. See Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, The Architectures of Mandated Access Con-
trols (visited June 6, 1999) <http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/papers/lessig98/index.
html> (presented at Telecommunications Policy Research Conference Sept. 1998) (propos-
ing an abstract model for mandated access controls to Internet Web sites).
20. It has been argued that changes in nineteenth century tort law made it more difficult
for individual plaintiffs to recover from industrial enterprises, such as railroad companies.
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
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information revolution, it may be possible to avoid such gross forms of in-
direct subsidy to favored enterprises that come with the attendant risk of
unacceptably high costs for individuals. The more sophisticated models for
managing the risks of on-line authentication technology that are now being
developed in the private sector may also hold the answer for managing the
risks associated with using such technologies in the public sector. Until it
is clear that such solutions are not viable, especially if a political consensus
supporting the public sector use of such technologies does not, in fact, yet
exist, there should not be a rush to lock in liability rules that discourage
even public sector parties from developing and deploying sophisticated risk
management strategies.
II. PUBLIC SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT
Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a sovereign from
being haled into the very courts that the sovereign provides, unless the sov-
ereign has consented. The doctrine originated in the distant past of modem
state legal systems before the notion of separation of powers had been ar-
ticulated. If all the powers of government resided in one person, that per-
son could not very well be expected to both hear and defend complaints
against the sovereign. 21 While this justification is no longer very compel-
ling, more modem ones have been developed to supplant it. In the nine-
teenth century, the Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity is
justified as it defends the public interest rather than the government's inter-
est.
22
The protection of sovereign immunity can be waived, and in the United
States many statutes waive governmental immunity to liability for torts.
For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 23 permits suits against
the United States for state negligence torts committed by federal agencies
(1977) (detailing evolution of law as industrialization began in the United States). The dif-
ficulty of recovery as a plaintiff against the railroad companies is an example of a disguised
subsidy to such industry. Id.
21. Blackstone stated the principle as "the King can do no wrong." WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 238-39 (1992).
Alexander Hamilton asserted that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
248 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981); see also Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("[A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or absolute theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
22. See The Siren., 74 U.S. 152, 154 (1868) (concluding there could be possible dam-
age to interests of citizenry as a whole caused by lawsuits brought by private citizens inter-
fering with orderly operation of government).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994 & Supp. 111 997).
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and agents. The FTCA exposes the United States to liability for money
damages for the negligence of its employees in "circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accor-
dance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 24 In
1998, the FTCA was amended to provide that if an official is "acting within
the scope of his office or employment," he has absolute immunity from
common law tort liability, therefore, a suit against the federal government
under the FTCA provides the exclusive remedy.25 The FTCA contains nu-
merous exceptions, including the "discretionary function" exception, which
precludes a suit against the United States "based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved [is] abused. 26 In formulating this
exception, Congress sought to prevent its limited waiver of sovereign im-
munity from interfering with governmental policymaking.27 So while in
many specific situations the government may be liable in suits with private
citizens, the general principle of sovereign immunity remains intact.
Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity shelters those who act on
behalf of the state from suffering many of the adverse consequences of the
decisions they make, risk management strategies used by public sector en-
tities with regard to the exercise of their sovereign functions differ greatly
from risk management strategies used by actors in the private sector who
enjoy no such immunity. In executing laws and policies developed to fur-
ther the public interest, governmental units define the approach they will
take and allocate a finite amount of resources to solve the problem. For ex-
ample, with regard to maintaining the safety of those traveling on public
roads, state and local governments will allocate a certain amount of re-
sources to developing and administering driving tests and a certain amount
of resources to police and state highway patrols to monitor the conduct of
drivers. The standards developed are supposed to be impartial and nondis-
criminatory in light of the public purpose they are designed to further. To
pursue the driver's license example, state governments issue drivers' li.
censes to teenagers who meet the minimum standards of competence even
though it is possible to predict as a statistical matter that those teenagers
may commit more motor vehicle offenses or accidentally cause more harm
to others than older drivers.
24. Id. § 1346(b).
25. Id. § 2679(b)(1).
26. Id. § 2680(a).
27. See generally Note, Government Tort Liability, I I I HARv. L. REv. 2009 (1998)
(discussing government tort liability and effects on policymaking).
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Should later experience show that the quantity of resources allocated to
achieving a particular public purpose was inadequate, the governmental
unit will not normally be liable for monetary damages for its failure to
achieve its stated objective. Continuing with the driver's license example,
someone injured in a car accident can generally sue any person whose neg-
ligence contributed to the accident, and can even sue the governmental unit
charged with maintaining the road if the failure to do so contributed to the
accident and the governmental unit has. waived by statute its sovereign im-
munity. The injured party cannot sue the state department that issued the
liable party's driver's license for failure to discover that driver's incompe-
tence, however. Similar examples could be drawn from other police pow-
ers exercised by the state, such as law enforcement building or health code
compliance, or regulation of different industries.
The consequences of miscalculations in resource allocations by public
sector actors are felt primarily in the political sphere, not in litigation.
When sovereign power to allocate resources is exercised by elected offi-
cials, the recourse for people unhappy with the officials' decisions is politi-
cal rather than legal. For example, New Yorkers who are less concerned
than Mayor Rudolph Giuliani with the lack of civility in New York or with
problems such as jaywalking, or who believe that law enforcement agen-
cies should not in any event be directing significant amounts of time and
energy to addressing those problems, can ridicule his campaigns in the
mass media or try to vote Giuliani out of office.2"
III. PRIVATE SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT
With the abolition of debtors' prisons and slavery in the nineteenth cen-
tury in the United States, 29 the only recourse an individual generally has
against another for failure to fulfill a private obligation is an action against
that other person's property. Misconduct of a nature so serious as to entail
the possibility of criminal prosecution is within the exclusive competence
of the state to punish30 and, in modern legal systems, is outside the scope of
28. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Giuliani Crows as Theft Suspect Is Caught on Jay-
walking Charge, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 21, 1998, at BI (commenting on Mayor Giuliani's civil-
ity campaign).
29. See generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA I (1974)
(explaining relations between debtors and creditors within certain regions around the United
States); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991) (discussing bankruptcy law in United States, including advent
of permanent federal bankruptcy law in 1898).
30. At English common law, there was initially no clear distinction between the right
of the sovereign and the right of the citizen to prosecute crimes. The right of private crimi-
nal prosecution was not abolished under English law until 1819. See 59 Geo. I1l, c.46
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private sector liability rules. The consequences of a party to a contractual
transaction failing to fulfill its obligations may give rise to a right for
monetary compensation or equitable relief, but where the subject of the
contract is a commercial matter, the value of equitable relief can be con-
verted to monetary terms with relatively little loss of meaning. As a result,
the ultimate consequences of different possible outcomes that must be
analyzed in order to perform risk management in the private sector can be
expressed in terms of financial values.
Unlike a government agency acting in its sovereign capacity, actors in
the private sector will not be able to externalize onto the public the costs
associated with failed endeavors. While the rigor of liability regimes varies
across the spectrum of private obligations based in tort and contract law, as
a general principle, private actors will be expected to bear the costs associ-
ated with their failures. If a private party is uncertain or concerned about
the magnitude of costs that may result from a particular course of action,
the private party has an array of risk management techniques available to
guarantee its ability to meet those obligations no matter what the outcome
of its conduct.
3
'
In a system in which obligations are voluntarily assumed, as they are in
commercial transactions, private parties are expected to estimate the costs
and benefits associated with particular courses of conduct, and undertake a
course of conduct only when the expected benefits are greater than the ex-
pected costs. Risk management is practiced both at the level of the indi-
vidual act and at the level of aggregates of individual acts. If an individual
person seriously miscalculates the risks of certain acts or a course of con-
duct, creating financial obligations in excess of the individual's ability to
pay, the individual may ultimately be able to externalize some of his or her
losses onto individual claimants by obtaining a bankruptcy discharge of
those obligations. For a legal entity such as a corporation, the ultimate
consequence of failing to calculate correctly the magnitude of risk associ-
ated with a particular act or course of conduct may be the termination of
the legal entity. The liquidation and winding up of a corporation will also
externalize the consequences of the corporation's failure to meet its obliga-
tions onto the creditors of the corporation. Unlike a sovereign, however, a
corporation may not be permitted another chance to solve the problem after
externalizing the costs of its earlier unsuccessful attempts. For businesses
unable to reorganize their liabilities, the consequences for failure to manage
(1819).
3 1. These range from simply refraining from taking the risky act, to setting aside suffi-
cient resources to cope with the worst possible outcome should it materialize, to participat-
ing in an insurance system or other risk pooling scheme.
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risk successfully is the termination of the private entity, forcing
stakeholders to realize the loss of their interests in the venture.
Laws imposing liability are among the factors private parties must take
into account when attempting to estimate and manage risk, as are estimates
of how markets and individuals will behave in the future. In a market-
based economy, because private parties must bear the consequences of their
actions, they are normally allowed wide latitude to establish their own cri-
teria for evaluating risk and act in light of that evaluation. By contrast,
common carriers are required, as a condition of receiving their franchise, to
post nondiscriminatory terms on which they will conduct business and to
accept anyone who meets the basic requirements for a transaction. 32 Out-
side the realm of business franchises imbued with a public purpose, such as
common carriers, or situations where fundamental values from the public
sphere spill over into the private sphere, such as civil rights laws that pro-
hibit discrimination in private sector transactions in employment, housing,
and other areas, private parties are expected to develop criteria that permit
them to discriminate between risks they are prepared to accept and those
they are not.
In a market economy, private parties that develop criteria that estimate
risk accurately will enjoy a higher rate of return on invested resources than
those who are less successful at estimating risk. While the probability of
particular outcomes at the level of the individual transaction may be diffi-
cult to estimate, the probability of particular outcomes becomes much more
predictable when transactions are aggregated into groups. Unlike the sov-
ereign, who is expected to serve the public found within the sovereign's
territory, parties acting in the private sector are generally permitted to pick
and choose which risks are added to the pool. Risks that cannot be avoided
can often be hedged by voluntarily entering into an offsetting transaction
with the opposite risk characteristics. In a modem economy in which pri-
vate parties no longer act based on personal relationships or in face-to-face
encounters with other parties, profitability will accrue to parties that de-
velop better formal criteria for selecting desirable risks out of large num-
bers of possible transactions, monitoring and pooling those risks once they
have been selected, and finding strategies to hedge risks that cannot be
avoided.
Automated risk management is at the heart of electronic commerce,
whether that electronic commerce takes place over closed, proprietary net-
works of computers, or open, public networks such as the Internet.33 The
32. 13 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 178 (1964) (noting non-discrimination requirements for
common carriers).
33. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and the Regula-
tion of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177 (1998) (comparing closed and open net-
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use of the Internet or other open data networks in commercial transactions
offers the possibility of greater network economies and lower communica-
tion and information processing costs than were possible with an earlier
generation of closed, proprietary data networks and mainframe computer
systems. If problems created by the lack of security of Internet communi-
cations can be resolved, then the Internet may eventually displace existing
computer networks that support large-scale electronic commerce systems
such as financial markets. Financial institutions, such as banks, have been
at the forefront of developing formal models to evaluate risk and manage
portfolios of transactions in part because financial market values can be
represented mathematically more easily than the values in some other types
of commercial transactions. Part of the promise of the next generation of
electronic commerce business applications is that a similar process of stan-
dardizing terms for transactions will take place as communication and in-
formation processing costs fall, and the kind of liquidity and transparency
now characteristic of mature financial markets will spread to other markets.
If electronic commercial practices can gain acceptance across a wide range
of markets, then market participants of all descriptions will benefit from
lower transaction costs.
IV. COMMERCIAL PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE DESIGN TO DATE
Commercial transactions cannot take place without systems in place to
manage not just the risks of changes in market conditions, but also the risks
of fraud and error. In the world of paper-based commerce, those systems
are provided in large part by accounting principles and business adminis-
trative policies. Some of those principles and policies will be used for the
same purposes in electronic commerce; however, new elements will have
to be added to those systems because electronic commerce involves new
risks compared to traditional paper-based administrative systems. Certain
types of fraud and error are more difficult to detect and control in electronic
environments than in environments where administrative processes rely on
paper and face-to-face interactions. In addition, electronic commerce can-
not be conducted over open computer networks such as the Internet unless
some system is put in place to control the threats to system security associ-
ated with open network communication systems.
34
work electronic commerce).
For a discussion of the importance of risk management processes in electronic com-
merce see Dan Geer, Risk Management Is Where the Money Is, 20 THE RISKS DIGEST 6
(Nov. I1, 1998) <http://www.catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html>, and David G. Masse &
Andrew D. Fernandes, Economic Modelling and Risk Management in Public Key Infra-
structures (last modified Apr. 15, 1997) <http://www.chait-amyot.ca/docs/pki.htm>.
34. See generally FRED B. SCHNEIDER, TRUST IN CYBERSPACE (1999) (implying role of
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Some of the risks associated with open network communication systems
must be managed at the level of network security, and some must be man-
aged at the level of communication security.35 At the level of network se-
curity, the network architecture must be designed to provide certain secu-
rity services, such as authenticating users of the network, controlling access
to the network, preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information asso-
ciated with the network, preserving the integrity of information communi-
cated or stored within the network, and a system to provide for non-
repudiation of authenticated communications. 36 For example, the use of a
"firewall" is often a part of the network security architecture, which screens
all traffic directed at the network and permits only traffic that meets net-
work security standards to pass through it and enter the network.37 Com-
munication or message security issues are among the network security is-
sues that must be resolved in designing a secure system. These
communication securities issues include establishing trustworthy proce-
dures for authentication of messages, guaranteeing the integrity of mes-
sages, and non-repudiation of messages.
One technology that can be used as part of communication security is
asymmetric, or "public key" cryptography 38 deployed within a system, or
infrastructure, that permits its use over a network. Public key cryptography
involves the use of two separate but related cryptographic keys for en-
crypting and decrypting text. One key is kept private and held by a single
party, while the other key may be distributed publicly to anyone in com-
munication with the individual holding the private key. The keys need not
be used to encrypt the entire document because by encrypting only a hash
or digest, representing the entire message, a digital signature may be pro-
duced with the private key. The party receiving the "signed" message may
use the sender's public key to decrypt the message digest, and by compar-
ing the decrypted message digest with a second digest generated by the re-
cipient of the message, determine whether the message has been modified
government in protecting public welfare requires building trustworthy networked informa-
tion system).
35. See SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 466-68 (noting differences between communica-
tions security and network security such as communications security focusing more on pro-
tecting integrity of "transmitted information," while network security takes into account en-
tire network, as well as issues of authentication and cryptography).
36. See id. at 472 (describing security services provided by network security systems).
37. See id. at 506 (providing description of term firewall as a barrier "built around a
network or subnetwork to protect it from the outside").
38. For a general description of public key cryptography see for example, WARWICK
FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION (1997), SIMSON GARFINKEL &
GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE (1998), and BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE
WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 3.06 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999).
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with since it was signed. If the digital signature is verified in this manner,
the recipient knows not only that the message has not been altered, but also
that the message could only have been signed by someone with access to
the private key associated with the public key used to decrypt the digest.
So long as the recipient is certain that only one natural person can gain ac-
cess to the private key, then the material world identity of the holder of the
private key can be associated with the message in much the same manner
that a manual signature made on paper with a pen associates a natural hu-
man being with the text of the paper document.
In a world in which face-to-face communications are not feasible, a sys-
tem must be designed to distribute public keys so that holders of public
keys feel confident that they know the material world identity of the person
controlling the associated private key. One element of such a system might
be a trusted third party who distributes keys to end users. If the procedure
whereby the trusted third party binds a material world identity to a pair of
cryptographic keys is the issuance of a certificate that includes the public
key of the key pair, this trusted third party may be called a Certificate
Authority (CA).39
A system within which public keys are distributed is often referred to as
"public key infrastructures" (PKI)40 and are designed to constrain the costs
associated with using public and private keys to minimize the risks of fraud
and error. The most widely known model of a PKI is based on the model
of a telephone directory.4' This model was first advanced by two of the
developers of asymmetric cryptography, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hell-
man in a paper published in 1976,42 and expanded with the notion of "cer-
tificates" by a paper written in 1977 by Loren Kohnfelder, then an under-
graduate at MIT.43 If a PKI operates in the same manner as a telephone
39. A CA may also bind a pseudononymous identity to a key pair, or a role. In a
closed "public key infrastructures" (PKI), the CA may not be a third party, but may be one
of the two parties in communications. E-mail from Dwight Arthur to Jane Kaufman Winn
(Apr. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
40. The term is often associated with specific designs for distributing public keys, such
as the system described in the ABA DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 24.
However, the idea of a "web of trust" associated with the use of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
encryption program might also be described as a PKI since PGP is based on asymmetric
cryptography. See GARFINKEL & SPAFFORD, supra note 38, at 213 (describing PGP and
"web of trust").
41. See Joan Feigenbaum, Towards an Infrastructure for Authorization, Position Paper,
3RD USENIX WORKSHOP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (Sept. 1998).
42. Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, IT-22 (1976).
43. Loren M. Kohnfelder, Towards a Practical Public-Key Cryptosystem (1978) (un-
published B.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), cited in Rohit Khare & Adam
Rifkin, Weaving a Web of Trust (last modified Nov. 30, 1997) <http://www.cs.caltech.edu/
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directory it serves to associate a signature verification key with a name in a
directory, so that someone verifying a digital signature can look up, in a di-
rectory, the public key used to verify the signature to find the name of the
person associated with that key. A great deal of time and attention has
been focused on the issues associated with building a reliable PKI based on
this model. The problems associated with deployment of this model in-
clude complex issues of cross certification and hierarchies of certification,
as well as issues associated with the issuance and revocation of certifi-
cates.44
The primary shortcomings of the telephone directory model of PKI as
deployed in commercial settings may not be at the technical level, however.
Rather, it is unclear whether such a directory, even if successfully designed
and deployed, would ever be adequate to support the development of new
forms of electronic commerce over the Internet. Transactors in the material
world do not make the decision to execute a transaction because they have
found the counter-party's name in a telephone directory, and merely
knowing that there is some connection between a person and a public key
will not be enough to permit electronic commercial transactions to go for-
ward. The value of telephone directories and telephones in the material
world derives in part from the fact that the function of telephones is well
understood. A telephone number was usually associated with a particular
telephone with a fixed location connected to the network by metal wires,
and that fixed location was usually at an address that corresponded to a
specific individual, family, or organization that was already known to the
person using the directory.4 5 Digital signatures do not have any commonly
recognized association with roles in the material world. The design of user
interfaces and access controls has not advanced to the point where the as-
sociation of a natural human being with a digital signature can be accepted
with confidence. Even if the name of a human being can be reliably asso-
ciated with a digital identifier, there is not yet any system for managing the
risk that more than one human being can be the legitimate bearer of that
46
name.
Commercial transactions will be executed by the parties when the risks
associated with the transaction can be identified and managed, which will
-adam/local/trust.html> at n.37.
44. See generally FORD & BAUM, supra note 38.
45. See Feigenbaum, supra note 41, at 17; see also E-mail from Carl Ellison, Senior
Security Architect, Intel Corporation, to Jane Kaufman Winn, Associate Professor, Southern
Methodist University School of Law (Jan. 17, 1999).
46. The reader may confirm the magnitude of this problem by typing his or her first
and last name into an on-line telephone directory such as http://www.switchboard.com. For
most individuals in the United States, this will produce a long list of listings of individuals
around the country with the same first and last names.
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require more information than the mere association of a name with a digital
identifier. Transacting parties will need to identify and mitigate the risks
associated with the various ways a counter-party may fail to perform as ex-
pected, including the risk of financial or credit default that the non-
financial elements of the transaction will not meet the parties expectations
due to a breach of warranty, or that the parties are subject to the jurisdiction
of courts in a remote location or subject to laws that produce surprising re-
sults when applied to this transaction. The risk that the counter-party is not
who it appears to be, or that the counter-party lacks the authority or com-
petence to enter into a binding agreement regarding the terms of the trans-
action, is one of the performance risks that must be identified and managed,
but clearly not the only one, or even the most important one, in all transac-
tions.47
At present, the practical value of digital signature certificates for com-
mercial transactions conducted in open network environments such as the
Internet is extremely limited because certificates contain so little informa-
tion. The information cannot be updated once the certificate is issued, and
the information that is contained in certificates may be of uncertain value.48
One way that this technology can be adapted to meet actual commercial
needs is to design a PKI for use within a closed system. Within a closed
system, the meaning of digital signature certificates can be defined with
sufficient rigor and access to private keys may be controlled effectively
enough to permit parties to act in reliance on a verified digital signature.
Information not available within the certificate can be accessed by mem-
bers of the closed system through other means. In effect, the addition of a
PKI to an existing closed business information system, populated exclu-
sively by parties with prior business relationships, supports improved ac-
cess controls within the closed system. This addition does not represent a
radically new approach to electronic commerce, even if communications
within such a closed system uses Internet networking protocols, however.
The more ambitious promoters of PKI as an Internet electronic commerce
solution have a more open model for PKI use in mind, which would sup-
port the execution of transactions between parties with no preexisting rela-
tionship over the Internet functioning as an open public network, not as a
virtual private network or extranet.
The first attempt to establish the meaning of a digital signature certifi-
cate in an electronic commerce environment established three roles for the
47. See John Gregory, Authentication of Digital Legal Records, 6 EDI L. REv. 47
(1999).
48. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and
Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REv. 739 (1998) (discussing limitations of procedures used to
issue Verisign "Digital IDs").
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parties - Certification Authority (CA), Subscriber (S), and Relying Party
(RP) - and then tried to map those roles onto recognized business law
doctrines.49 The CA is responsible for issuing certificates to subscribers
and for maintaining a list of certificates that have been revoked so that par-
ties who might rely on the certificate can determine whether it is still valid.
The S enters into a contractual relationship with the CA, agreeing to submit
accurate information when the certificate is issued, to notify the CA if the
certificate needs to be revoked, and to take care to maintain control over
the private key associated with the certified public key. The RP relies on
the digital signature certificate to verify the identity of a subscriber in con-
nection with a particular message that has been signed with S's private key.
A prudent RP would never rely on a certificate in any transaction involving
substantial risk of loss without first checking the certificate revocation list
(CRL) maintained by the CA. This three-sided PKI model corresponds
neatly to the telephone directory model: S deals with the publisher of the
directory and pays for the listing; once published, the telephone directory is
available for any member of the public to use and rely upon in finding
phone numbers.
Early adopters of this three-sided PKI model used a certificate practice
statement (CPS), which is written by the CA and sets forth the procedures
the CA will follow in issuing certificates to establish the rights and obliga-
tions of the participants in the PKI.50 The contract between the CA and S
can refer to the standards established by the CPS. For example, the CA
may agree to be liable to the S for any losses S incurs with respect to an
electronic commercial transaction in which a certificate issued by CA is
used to verify S's digital signature, but only if the losses are caused by fail-
ure of the CA to comply with the terms of its own CPS. Losses incurred by
S for any other reason, including failure by S to retain control over S's pri-
vate key, would be S's obligations alone.5'
A major problem with mapping this three-sided PKI model onto a real
commercial transaction is the lack of privity of contract between the CA
and RP. With regard to a particular electronic commercial transaction, RP
is the one trying to manage the risk that S is not actually the person that the
49. This is the model reflected in the ABA DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note
18, at 63-90, and has been used by Verisign in distributing "Digital IDs" through its Web
site at <http://www.verisign.com>.
50. A complex and technical CPS may be replaced by a simple, more general certifi-
cate policy, discussed below.
51. This loss allocation rule is the opposite of the rule currently applied in consumer
credit card transactions by Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, but follows the rule applied
for charges for unauthorized use of telephone services. See Winn, supra note 33, at 1235-
37.
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signature purports to identify, that S lacks the authority to enter into a
binding contract, or that S will be unable to perform his or her obligations
under the contract. RP would be willing to pay a third party to help man-
age those transaction risks, but the three-sided PKI model does not provide
a mechanism for RP and CA to bargain for an allocation of that service.
Rather, S has the opportunity to review the terms and conditions under
which CA issues certificates and determine what level of review by CA for
which S is willing to pay. As with the printed telephone directory, S may
have a cause of action against CA if the certificate is not issued in accor-
dance with the terms S and CA have set in their contract, but RP is a third
party with no rights defined by that S-CA contract, therefore RP has no
contractual cause of action against CA.
In the event an electronic commercial transaction goes sour and RP ex-
periences a loss, it would not take long for RP to consider trying to recover
from CA if S cannot be found or is judgment proof. One way for CA to
manage this risk is to try to establish some basis for a contractual relation-
ship with RP. CA might require RP to agree to be bound by the terms of
the CPS and to waive any claims against CA other than those based on
CA's failure to follow the terms of its own CPS as a condition of accessing
the CRL. Of course, this strategy will only work if RP is sufficiently pru-
dent to check the CRL before relying on it. If RP does not check the CRL
before relying, then there would be no obstacle to RP basing its claim
against CA strictly in tort.
RP's tort claim against CA would be based on a negligent misrepresen-
tation of information.52 RP would claim that, notwithstanding the fact that
CA may have followed the terms of its own CPS to the letter, the standards
established by the CPS were inadequate. As a result, the binding of S to
the digital signature certificate gave rise to a reasonable perception by RP
that CA had taken reasonable steps to guarantee that S was in-fact the per-
son RP believed S to be, when in fact CA had exercised a much lower and
negligent level of scrutiny of S's claims before issuing the certificate.
Whether or not RP would have any chance of prevailing on this theory
would depend on the facts of the case; however, it would seem very likely
that RP could withstand any summary judgment motion CA might make,
forcing CA to assume very substantial litigation expenses in establishing
the validity of its interpretation of the legal rights and obligations created
by the three-sided PKI model.
Even if RP clicks on an "I agree" button on the CA's Web site before
accessing the CRL indicating agreement to be bound by the termsof the
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965) (defining negligent misrepre-
sentation of information claim).
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CPS, it is not clear that this will limit the CA's exposure to litigation with
an RP. At best CA can argue that it is granting RP a license to access its
database of revoked certificates, and in exchange for the grant of a license,
RP must agree to be bound by the terms of that license, including a limit on
the contexts under which RP may rely on the binding of S's real world
identity to an on-line identity. RP can argue that no contract was formed,
because CA received no consideration from RP in exchange for RP being
granted access to the CRL if the only thing CA asks of RP is a waiver of
RP's right to sue for negligence when CA offers the CRL to the public.
CA might be able to bootstrap that limitation of liability for its standard of
review in issuing the certificate into a license limiting RP's right to use the
data in the CRL, but that is far from a certain outcome. In the three-sided
PKI model, CA is clearly conferring some benefit on RP, if RP accesses the
CRL, but it is difficult to identify what, if any, benefit RP confers on CA
that might count as consideration under classical contract theory. If CA is
able to persuade a court that a waiver of negligence claims somehow con-
stitutes consideration sufficient to support a finding that a contract exists
between CA and RP, CA has still not cut off all RP's claims to recover its
losses in its transaction with S. If the RP is not required to review the
terms of the CPS before agreeing, but instead is merely informed that those
terms are available for review, the RP may claim that even if a contract is
found to exist between CA and RP, the terms of the CPS are not terms in
that agreement.
Some of the problems associated with the three-sided PKI model can be
ameliorated by making the model four-sided and by introducing the con-
cept of a certificate policy (CP). 53 A CP is a document that may be drawn
up by any party, whether a RP or a more general "policy authority" who
represents the interests of all PKI stakeholders, stating the minimum stan-
dards a digital signature certificate should meet to be acceptable to anyone
who has adopted the CP. The three-sided PKI model was designed to serve
as a universal open-system PKI that could support commercial or any other
transaction in an on-line environment without being tailored to the particu-
lar circumstances of the individual transaction. Although the vision of a
universal PKI that can work in any on-line environment has largely been
abandoned as too ambitious in light of the rudimentary level of develop-
53. See National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA), The Internet Coun-
cil, Certification Authority Rating & Trust (CARAT) Guidelines: Guidelines for Construct-
ing Policies Governing the Use of Identity-Based Public Key Certificates (last modified
Sept. 21, 1998) <http://internetcouncil.nacha.org/CARAT/CARAT921.pdf> [hereinafter
CARAT Guidelines] (describing implementation of four-sided PKI model with CP); Federal
PKI Task Force Business and Legal Work Group, Model Certificate Policy, (last modified
Mar. 25, 1998) <http://www.mbc.com/model.cp.html> (discussion draft).
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ment of the technology and applications of the technology available today,
it may eventually prove to be a practical approach to the problem of man-
aging on-line identities. The four-sided PKI model and the development of
a CP reflects the efforts by transactors to define the contexts within which
digital signature certificate technology will be deployed with greater speci-
ficity. As the context within which certificates are better defined, the legal
ambiguities of the three-sided PKI model become less intractable.
In a four-sided PKI model, the role of the CA can be split into the roles
of local registration agent (LRA) and certificate utility (CU). 4 The LRA is
someone who has a pre-existing relationship with S and can therefore pro-
vide a meaningful level of scrutiny when certificates are issued to subscrib-
ers. The CU provides only the technical services associated with issuing
certificates and maintaining a CRL, and has no contractual relationship
with either S or RP. The information contained within the CPS in the
three-sided PKI model is divided into an internal document stating the
technical standards the CU will apply, and a contract governing the rela-
tionship between the LRA and S. The contract between the LRA and S
may also refer to RP's CP, if S knows it needs a digital signature certificate
that will be acceptable to RP. The amount of information S is required to
review and agree to in connection with the issuance of the certificate may
be less than when the contract between the CA and S incorporates by refer-
ence the entire CPS, which is the three-sided PKI model. In the context of
a pre-existing relationship between the LRA and S, S has a better chance of
understanding the rights and obligations associated with its use of the digi-
tal signature certificate. The LRA can also require that S only use the cer-
tificates issued by the CU in a particular context and have some confidence
that S will honor that limitation. The LRA will require S to limit S's use of
the certificate to transactions with only those RPs who agree to be bound
by the same terms S has agreed to be bound by in the contract between S
and the LRA, and to indemnify the LRA from any use by S inconsistent
with the terms of the agreement between S and the LRA. If the LRA has
reason to believe that S would not be able to pay for damages S might
cause and become liable for under such an indemnity agreement, the LRA
can decline to enroll S in the PKI.
If certificates used by RP to verify S's signature conform to the stan-
dards stated in the CP and the provisions of the CP correspond to RP's risk
management policies, then RP will be relying only on certificates that actu-
ally support RP's risk management policies. In order for this to occur, S
54. See Alexander Cavalli & Jane K. Winn, Internet Security in the Electric Utility In-
dustry, 38 JuRImETiucs J. 459 (1998) (describing LRA's role in a four-sided OASIS PKI
model); see also CARAT Guidelines, supra note 53 (describing a model similar to that used
in the OASIS PKI).
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must be aware of the provisions of the CP and ask for the LRA to warrant
that S's certificate is issued under conditions that meet the requirements set
out in the CP. As a practical matter, both the LRA and S will have to un-
derstand and accept the terms of the CP. If RP suffers a loss in an elec-
tronic commerce transaction and the LRA can show that the loss was not
caused by the LRA's failure to observe the standards established in the CP
but rather due to some other problem in the transaction, then the LRA will
be much more likely to prevail in its efforts to avoid liability on the trans-
action. This would be true whether RP tried to recover on a tort theory, or
on a theory that the terms and conditions that the LRA imposed as a condi-
tion to accessing a CRL were not part of a contract binding on RP.
Until the concept of a CP gains wide acceptance in electronic commerce
markets, and the terms of CPs are sufficiently standardized to be reflected
in standardized notations on the certificates themselves, the benefits of us-
ing a CP will be limited. Only a potential S who is engaged in a suffi-
ciently large value or long-term relationship will be able to justify the costs
of learning the terms of a CP designated by an RP, and to negotiate with a
LRA to guarantee that no certificates are issued to S that do not comply
with the CP. While this is not the same as requiring a closed system, it will
add considerable cost to transactions executed within the PKI. This may
make those transactions more expensive than if they were executed using
alternative electronic commerce technologies such as credit card informa-
tion sent over the Internet using Secured Sockets Layer (SSL) for secu-
rity."
One suggested solution to the problem of PKI design has been to elimi-
nate the role of the CA altogether and capitalize on pre-existing business
relationships for assurance that risk management criteria for transactions
are observed even in electronic environments. In the "account authority"
model of digital signatures, the public key associated with a particular indi-
vidual is stored within an existing electronic commerce system.56 The
public key is added to existing account-based information about a transac-
55. In 1999, the standard technology for guaranteeing the confidentiality of credit card
information in transit over the Internet is browser-based Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) tech-
nology. See SSL (Secured Sockets Layer) (last modified Jan. I, 1999) <http://whatis.com/
ssl.htm> (explaining what SSL is and how it works). SSL security is based on a very simple
form of PKI. For a general description of the use of SSL and credit cards as a risk manage-
ment system used in retail Internet commerce, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the titans:
Regulating the Competition Between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Sys-
tems, 14 BERK. TECH. L.J. 671 (1999).
56. See Anne Wheeler & Lynn Wheeler, Account Authority Digital Signature Model
(visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.garlic.com/-ynn/aadsover.htm> (explaining how pub-
lic keys are stored within existing non-face-to-face transaction capability in account author-
ity model).
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tor and takes the place of reference to a social security number, mother's
maiden name, or last deposit, as an authentication device." The simplicity
of the account authority digital signature model reduces the number of ob-
stacles that will have to be overcome before strong authentication technol-
ogy can be introduced in existing electronic commerce systems such as
credit card and debit card transaction systems. From the perspective of
transacting parties, the information needed before transactions can be ac-
cepted is provided through existing channels in currently recognizable for-
mats, and the authentication technology merely enhances existing network
security systems. Before the account authority digital signature model can
actually be implemented, however, changes in existing standards for elec-
tronic financial transactions will have to be revised, and existing applica-
tions based on those standards will have to be upgraded. In 1999, it was
still unclear whether such streamlined applications of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy would gain widespread acceptance in the electronic commerce mar-
ket.
Participants in a limited number of pilot projects based on the use of
PKIs to facilitate commercial transactions in on-line environments have
made their findings public. These include the Securities Industry Root
Certification Authority (SIRCA) 58 and the Certification Authority
Interoperability Pilot of the Internet Council of the National Automated
Clearing House Association (NACHA). 59 In terms of the contrast devel-
oped above between the three-party and four-party models, the SIRCA pi-
lot used the four-party model because each securities firm acted as an LRA
for its individual employees.60 The NACHA pilot used the three-party
model, permitting individuals to select a CA and have a certificate issued
without the intervention of an LRA for the purposes of the pilot.6' In view
of the lack of any substantive screening of individual participants, the cer-
tificates issued contained no information that linked the certificate to a real
world person, but rather referenced a dummy account number that had been
57. See id. (describing how public keys in account authority model replace existing
authentication devices).
58. See Securities Industry Root Certificate Authority (SIRCA) Concept Paper (last
modified Apr. 26, 1998) <http://www.sia.com/sirca/> [hereinafter SIRCA Concept Paper]
(explaining function of SIRCA).
59. See David Merrit & Juan Rodriguez Torrent, Building an Environment of Trust:
Certificate of Authority (CA) Interoperability (last modified Aug. 3, 1998)
<http://www.usenix.org/events/cc98/pki/torrent-html/index.htm> (describing NACHA's
PKI pilot project).
60. See SIRCA Concept Paper, supra note 58 (explaining how each SIRCA pilot secu-
rities firm functions as an LRA).
61. See Merrit, supra note 59 (describing how NACHA pilot customers can choose
participating financial institution as CA).
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established for the pilot.62 Following the completion of the first NACHA
pilot in 1998, a second pilot project is underway in 1999 that will test a
wider range of payment functions. 63 The second pilot, however, may still
involve pseudonymous certificates, dummy account numbers, and simu-
lated transactions, since the focus of the pilot is not transaction risk man-
agement, but the possibility of integrating browser-based user interfaces
into existing payment systems. Neither of these pilot projects involved the
execution of real transactions on-line in reliance on digital signatures, but
instead were designed to permit pilot participants to familiarize themselves
with the use of the technology. Outside these pilot projects, a large number
of organizations have adopted PKIs to enhance security of their internal
operations. While these organizations may be conducting tests with trading
partners involving the execution of real transactions on-line in reliance on
digital signatures, the results of such tests are not generally made available
to the public.
V. TRUST MANAGEMENT VS. RISK MANAGEMENT
With regard to information system security, systems can be evaluated in
terms of their trustworthiness. Management of the trustworthiness of an in-
formation system includes managing the ability of the information system
to resist known threats and to perform reliably under a wide range of fore-
seeable adverse circumstances. 64 This sense of the word trust greatly dif-
fers from the legal sense of the word, it also differs from the business prac-
tice of risk management. Risk management in a business context generally
involves pooling risks to make them more predictable and hedging identi-
fied risks by matching them where possible with assets or liabilities to off-
setting risk characteristics.
65
Information systems cannot be proven to be "secure." Information sys-
tems can be designed according to the best available system security prin-
ciples, but because existing systems may have weaknesses which can be
exploited to breach current security features, it is not possible for any oper-
ating system to prove that it meets some absolute standard of security. As a
result, the system security managers aim for a standard of "trustworthi-
ness," which conveys the thought that the system has been tested against all
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 2 (explaining importance of trustworthiness to
network information systems).
65. See FRAINK J. FA ozzi & ATSUo KONISHI, THE HANDBOOK OF ASSET/LIABILITY
MANAGEMENT: STATE-OF-THE-ART INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, RISK CONTROLS AND
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS (1996) (discussing pooling and hedging against risk in a busi-
ness context).
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known threats, and within the constraints of available resources can with-
stand them. The concept of trustworthiness is not limited to internal com-
puter processes or the design of network communications, but includes the
security of the physical equipment as well. The notion of trustworthiness
conveys the idea that for any given input, the information system can be
trusted to generate a specific output because its processes are as resistant as
possible to corruption from internal or external forces. Any information
system must be reliable to a degree, but the label "trustworthy" is reserved
for information systems that have been evaluated and tested with regard to
their ability to withstand known security threats, which is a characteristic of
very few computer systems used for processes requiring heightened levels
of security. This notion of trustworthy information systems was originally
developed within the military. As more businesses move the management
of valuable assets and processes on-line, more businesses require access to
information systems providing a level of security similar to the trustworthy
systems developed by the military, either under their own control or by
agreement with operators of such systems.
The legal definition of trust includes the notion of performance that con-
forms with certain standards, but unlike the concept of a trustworthy infor-
mation processing system, recognizes that an element of discretion on the
part of the trustee may be unavoidable. The feudal origins of the Anglo-
American doctrine of trust involved making a transfer of rights in real
property that was absolute on its face but intended by the parties to be less
than a complete grant of ownership rights because the nominal owner was
expected to maintain the property for the benefit of another.66 The legal
concept of trust is thus based on a general concept of fiduciary duty, which
includes predicting what the trustee will do only in very general terms
while permitting the trustee discretion to make specific decisions as prob-
lems arise that the grantor could not foresee. Trustworthy information
systems, unlike trustees, are not expected to evaluate new contexts in light
of general standards but are expected to execute specific functions with the
highest degree of reliability possible. The Anglo-American legal concept
of trust must therefore clearly be distinguished from the technological stan-
dard of trustworthy.
Risk management involves loss avoidance, loss pooling, and hedging.
Loss avoidance involves adapting business processes to reduce the aggre-
gate level of losses associated with specific operations, and is similar to the
66. Fiduciary obligations not recognized by the common law writ system were never-
theless given legal effect by the Chancery exercising its jurisdiction as a court of equity
from its earliest operation. The English law of trusts was more fully developed following
the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1536. See generally CHARLES DONAHUE ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 348-53 (3d ed. 1993).
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information system security concept of trustworthiness. Loss pooling in-
volves tolerating a given level of statistically predictable losses and setting
aside financial resources to compensate for those losses when they occur.
Future losses can be estimated based on models derived from historical ex-
perience applied to the best information available about likely future devel-
opments. Where hedging or insurance is possible, businesses will face a
choice of how much risk to assume, and how much to pay to offset risk or
shift it to another party.
In a business management context, decision makers will face choices
about declining business likely to come with too high a risk of loss, or ac-
cepting business but paying a price in diminished profitability through
hedging or insurance costs. For example, a business making the decision to
do business on-line will have a choice between making its own decisions
about which orders to accept and which to decline, and paying for sophisti-
cated software that can assist the merchant in making those decisions.67 In
making the decision to buy the software, the manager will have to evaluate
not just the purchase price of the software but also the cost of running it on
existing information systems, or if that is not possible, the cost of upgrad-
ing an information system, the cost of training staff to insure the necessary
information is run through the software and can interpret its findings, the
cost of business lost through possible false positives indicating a high risk
of fraud or error when none is in fact present, and a range of other costs. If
the software is expensive to purchase or operate, a business may not be
able to justify purchasing it if the cost exceeds its predicted fraud and error
losses operating without it. The design of business information systems
specifically incorporates this type of tradeoff, but the design of those sys-
tems designated "trustworthy" does not do so, or at least not to the same
degree. In the historical context of Cold War military information system
security where the term "trustworthy" was first used, there were few practi-
cal constraints on the volume of resources that could be invested to achieve
the desired result, and trustworthy information systems were supposed to
be as safe as it was possible to make them.
When business information systems were based on centralized, main-
frame computer systems, there were reasonably well-established standards
for policing system security. The design of secure information systems has
become considerably more complex with the advent of client/server com-
puter systems, the Internet, and the practice of mixing and matching vari-
ous "off-the-shelf" software packages within systems. 6 Security has not
67 Such software can evaluate credit card orders as received and rate those orders in
light of historical experience with regard to the likelihood that the information in the order is
fraudulent, or contains errors that will cause the merchant to suffer losses.
68. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 12-23 (discussing growth and dependence on
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kept pace with innovation in the business use of computers, and as a result,
client/server networked information systems in general do not possess the
same level of security as the old, centralized mainframe systems. There is
now a growing recognition that information system security is one of the
operational variables that must be taken into account in risk management. 69
As a result, the tradeoffs between greater security and resistance to known
threats will have to be balanced explicitly against other business objectives
such as speed of transaction processing, ease of the use of computer facili-
ties, decentralized exercise of discretion by users, geographic dispersion of
access, and other factors. With this integration of information system secu-
rity factors into the general business calculus of risk management, the no-
tion of trustworthiness of information systems may depart from the histori-
cal meaning of categorically as resistant to threats as is possible to build,
and take on a meaning closer to incorporating an appropriate level of re-
sistance to threats in light of the business context and level of resources
available for all objectives including security.
VI. SHOULD EITHER HEDGEHOGS OR FOXES ACCEPT DIGITAL
SIGNATURES?
Public key infrastructure design to date would seem adequate to support
the type of risk management typical of the public sector, although it is
clearly not yet sufficiently nuanced to support private sector risk manage-
ment.7" The notion of a trustworthy system was developed within the pub-
lic sector without reference to the kind of cost/benefit balancing that cannot
be avoided within private sector risk management contexts. Until more ad-
vanced technologies, such as the use of standard certificate extensions to
refer to certificate policies in certificates can be standardized and become
widely used, digital signature certificates can only provide a snapshot of a
limited number of variables at a specific point in time.7" One of the most
common variables a digital signature certificate is used to represent is the
identity of a human actor, which is too gross a concept to support most
business transaction applications. Risk management that takes transaction
level risks as a basic input will not be compatible with the use of a PKI un-
til better ways are found to either integrate PKIs with existing business in-
network information systems and vulnerabilities which are included creating need for more
complex systems).
69. See, e.g., Ernst & Young, Assurance and Advisory Service with an Eye to the Fu-
ture (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.ey.com/aabs/> (presenting information systems
security background and business).
70. See Gregory, supra note 47, at 58.
71. See FORD & BAUM, supra note 38, at 226 (describing current limitations of digital
signature certificates).
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formation systems, as in the AADS model, or modify the structure of the
PKI permit the processing of more transaction-specific information. Sim-
ply knowing the identity of a party or having a snapshot of an individual's
creditworthiness at an earlier point in time is not adequate to support a de-
cision to execute or decline to execute a transaction at a later date. 72 Cur-
rent automated business transaction systems have a variety of processes
that channel the flow of necessary information to decision-makers, such as
on-line authorization systems that provide up-to-date information about a
counter-party's creditworthiness. The work of integrating the technology
that provides such information to decision-makers and the technology that
provides a PKI has not yet advanced beyond the level of pilot projects.
Simple identity might be suitable as an analog to citizenship in the pub-
lic sphere, where liberal notions such as equality before the law are meant
to diminish the significance of variations between individual identities un-
der certain circumstances. As a result, it might seem reasonable to con-
clude the current design of PKIs seem well suited to the needs of public
sector hedgehogs while poorly suited to the needs of private sector foxes.
Risk management is only one of many factors that go into the articulation
and realization of the public interest, however. Before suggesting that the
public sector should invest in developing a PKI to support on-line civic in-
teractions, at least two issues need to be addressed: first, whether there is
any public interest in using this technology in light of the potential for ad-
verse consequences its use may have; and second, whether there is any jus-
tification for using the sovereign immunity risk management model even
when this technology is being used by the government or for a public pur-
pose.
One of the most obvious reasons a democratic government might be in-
terested in the use of on-line communications would be a desire to enrich
and invigorate public discourse. There is a conflict, however, between the
manner in which a PKI supports more secure communications in an on-line
environment and the values of vigorous public debate. The ability of com-
puters to capture and store information that associates particular individuals
with on-line activity, including on-line speech and on-line accessing of in-
formation, raises profoundly troubling issues of how classical liberal values
can be preserved in on-line environments.73 These are issues about which
72. Peter Freund, Chairman of CertCo, Inc., pointed this out to me.
73. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copy-
right Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 981, 1003-19 (1996) (advocating that
First Amendment rights to read anonymously applies in cyberspace); A. Michael Froomkin,
Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Dis-
tributed Databases, 15 J.L. & CoM. 395, 479-82 (1996) (expressing concern over possible
erosion of privacy on Internet); Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CuMB. L. REV.
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the public debate in the United States has barely begun, and with regard to
which no consensus yet exists.
In 1998, the U.S. General Services Administration launched an ambi-
tious project to provide more government services on-line. This project in-
cluded Access Certificates for Electronic Services (ACES), 74 a PKI to pro-
vide identity-based authentication where necessary in on-line interactions
between members of the public and the federal government. This program
immediately raised concerns among privacy advocates. The Center for
Democracy and Technology described its concerns in the following terms:
The ACES project threatens individual liberty and privacy by:
" escalating the collection and centralization of data about an individ-
ual's identity and activities, potentially increasing government inter-
vention in our daily lives. The registration authorities must be mul-
tiple, diverse and, where possible, created only for programmatic
purposes. ACES' current plans to have a few large registration
authorities with similar core elements would, in practice, not meet
this goal.
* creating a de facto identity requirement for every interaction with
the government. The project should strive to aid in the limitation of
the collection of personal information online. Simply mandating
agencies to allow all services off-line, avoids dealing with the diffi-
cult concerns around these issues.
* failing to establish fair information practices to protect data collected
and generated by its use.75
Until some form of consensus emerges on these difficult issues, it will
be difficult to articulate standards regarding the proper use of this technol-
ogy by government.
Even if the public benefit derived from adapting a PKI to use in the pub-
lic sector can be clearly established, it remains unclear whether there is any
justification for applying a sovereign immunity risk management model to
that use. The sovereign immunity risk management model authorizes the
shifting of risks either away from parties providing infrastructure services,
such as certification authorities, onto parties using the PKI, or away from
parties who wish to rely on a digitally signed message onto parties whose
digital signature may have been affixed without authorization. The most
1, 7 (1996) (posing questions of Fourth Amendment protection in cyberspace).
74. See Access Certificates for Electronic Services (visited Apr. 19, 1999)
<http://www.gsa.gov/aces/> (detailing information about ACES project).
75. See Response To Letter From General Services Administration (GSA) Addressing
CDT's Concern On the Access Certificates For Electronic Services (ACES) Initiative (June
29, 1998) <http://www.cdt.org/digsig/gsaletterrep.html> (arguing successful implementation
of ACES project would undermine both individual privacy and healthy development of
Internet).
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traditional justification for sovereign immunity, that the king cannot be
haled into his own courts without his permission, can no longer plausibly
be used to justify such shifting of risks away from the public sector party to
a private sector party. It is also unclear, however, whether the more mod-
em justification for sovereign immunity is valid in this case. That justifi-
cation permits externalizing risks away from public sector actors onto pri-
vate sector individuals in order to prevent the public sector actors from
becoming hobbled by the threat of potentially crippling liabilities. If more
sophisticated risk management strategies are being developed in the private
sector, and those strategies can be adapted for public sector use, then the
apparent conflict between imposition of liability and accomplishment of
public purpose might be eliminated.
Licensing statutes, such as that adopted by Utah, provide a clear shelter
from liability for CAs that meet rigorous licensing standards.7 6 As a regu-
lated entity, the CA would enjoy the same kind of immunity from liability
the state itself enjoys provided it operates within the framework established
by the Utah statute.7 This limit of liability is premised on the assumption
that the licensing framework established by the statute will minimize or
eliminate the most serious risks to the public associated with the use of
digital signatures and create the electronic equivalent of a regulated finan-
cial institution or a common carrier. If the licensing framework fails to
create the functional equivalent of an on-line common carrier, then the
statute will have authorized a transfer of resources from users of the tech-
nology to the owners of the infrastructure services without having guaran-
teed public benefit in return. Until there is some experience regarding how
infrastructure services are in fact used, it will be impossible to determine
whether the licensing statutes have achieved their objective.
Statutes that shift the risks of unauthorized ise of digital signatures away
from the parties relying on those signatures to the parties whose signature
was used without authorization create a subsidy for relying parties at the
expense of subscribers. 78 If the same parties are both relying parties and
subscribers, then there would be no distributional effect from this shift in
liabilities. If, however, some parties are consistently relying parties, and
others are consistently subscribers, then there will be a shift in costs from
the first group to the second. If the first group are merchants who deal di-
rectly with developers of on-line authentication technology, and the second
group are consumers who make purchases of mass market off-the-shelf
software and hardware with limited abilities to evaluate the functionality of
76. Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1998).
77. See id § 46-3-309 (granting licensed CAs limited immunity from liablity).
78. See C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners (1997) <http://www.
w3joumal.com/7/53biddle.wrap.htm>.
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the technology or to have input into its design, then such a shift will actu-
ally undermine existing incentives for developers of infrastructure tech-
nologies and their primary customers, the on-line merchants, to improve
the functionality of these technologies.
There may be a basic misconception about how new technologies such
as PKIs will map onto social institutions built into law reforms aimed at
aiding technology developers, service providers, or relying parties such as
merchants. This misconception has been called "cyberspace utopianism"
'7 9
or "cyberanarchy."80 The misconception consists of presuming that condi-
tions in cyberspace are so different from those prevailing in other environ-
ments regulated by modem legal orders that wholly new responses must be
devised in order to permit orderly social interactions to take place. If on-
line authentication services are so novel and so unrelated to existing sys-
tems for identifying counter-parties that prior precedents cannot be helpful,
and there is some kind of moral imperative for governments to move
quickly to enshrine recognition of that novelty in statutory liability regimes,
then either the licensing model or the relying party protection model of risk
shifting are justified by sound public policy. This cyber-utopian vision
about the supposed novelty of on-line social interactions resonates with the
hedgehog's totalizing vision, and the philosophical visions of some of the
noted hedgehogs in history such as Marx, Rousseau or Plato.
On-line authentication services may in fact be dramatically more diffi-
cult to accomplish in a "cyberspace" world in which strangers collide in a
social vacuum, divorced from all prior contexts and relationships. If such a
"no prior relationship" transaction is the one that on-line authentication
methods must be designed to solve, then perhaps a legislative subsidy in
the form of limited liability for the developers and providers of this service
can be justified. There is already evidence, however, that the most success-
ful examples of "cyberspace" commerce to date are not based on terribly
novel models after all. Some of the most successful Internet businesses
actually conform closely to established models of electronic commerce,
such as electronic verification and processing of credit card charges, or
electronic data interchange contracting."' If incremental changes in elec-
79. John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Uto-
pianism, 74 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
80. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (argu-
ing cyberspace transactions are no less resistant to conflict of law issues than other non-
cyberspace transactions).
81. Among the most successful Internet electronic commerce merchants are Cisco
Systems Inc, which is using a modified EDI model to make more than $1 billion in sales per
quarter, see Cisco Connection Online The Worldwide Leader in Networkingfor the Internet
(visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.cisco.com/>, and Dell Computers, which is using credit
cards to make more than $14 million in sales per day over its Web site, see Dell Computer
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tronic commerce models developed for an earlier generation of networked
computer systems can meet the needs of most parties wishing to interact in
cyberspace, then there is no compelling public need at this time to subsi-
dize the development of solutions that support anonymous interactions
between strangers in "cyberspace." This older generation of standards for
electronic communications resembles the empirically-based, detail-oriented
vision of the fox. While the fox's narrower, more focused vision lacks the
charismatic appeal of the hedgehog's sweeping vision, it may provide a
firmer foundation for articulating public policy in this area.
CONCLUSION
Berlin studied Tolstoy's philosophical discourses embedded within War
and Peace and found that, notwithstanding his aspiration to a hedgehog-
like encompassing vision of the human condition, Tolstoy could not avoid,
fox-like, being distracted by its complexity and ambiguity.8 2 This study of
the early stages of designing and implementing PKIs to enhance the secu-
rity of open public networks such as the Internet has come to a similar con-
clusion. While many sincere believers in the importance of this new tech-
nology have advocated hedgehog-like liability limits for those promoting
its use in both public and private sector applications, careful analysis re-
veals that fox-like risk management strategies are more likely to be appro-
priate for private sector applications. Furthermore, risk management
strategies developed for private sector transactions might find applications
in public sector uses for this technology, and might eliminate the need for
law reform to change current liability rules. The risk management strate-
gies appropriate to public and private sector applications of this technology
may ultimately diverge; at this time, however, both public and private sec-
tor risk management strategies are still under development. Until the form
of those strategies has more clearly taken shape, there is good reason to
hesitate before locking in mandatory loss-shifting regimes through legisla-
tion even for public sector uses.
The technological infrastructure to support secure electronic commerce
conducted over open networks such as the Internet is being put in place to-
day. The appropriate legislative response to those developments is unclear,
and different governments are trying a wide range of approaches. Which
business models will permit parties to capitalize successfully on these de-
velopments is likewise unclear, and a bewildering array of enterprises are
competing to establish standards in this area. The government, acting to
First Major PC Company to Offer Protection Against Credit Card Fraud with Secured
Shopping Guarantee (last modified Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.dell.com/corporate/media/
newsreleases/98/9808/I3.htm>.
82. See HEDGEHOG & Fox, supra note I, at 80.
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advance the public interest, must look at these developments as a whole
and evaluate their relationship to established social and political policies.
The globalizing perspective of the hedgehog, combined with its impenetra-
ble defenses against attack, is appropriate when the whole is visible, which
is arguably not yet the case.
